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1. Prologue: Unforgettable Holidays
It was an unforgettable holiday trip for the two young Ecuadorians Joana and Theresa in 
spring 2007.1 They were on their way from Belgium to the romantic city of Heidelberg 
to visit the world famous castle and see a friend who had invited them to meet her family 
for the Easter weekend. However, their itinerary was changed and instead they spent the 
weekend in Ingelheim, a lovely medieval town situated in picturesque vineyards close to 
the UNESCO World Heritage Site Middle Rhine. Unfortunately, they did not enjoy the 
pleasures of a cosy hostel, but were accommodated in the local detention centre. What 
	 The	prologue	is	based	upon	the	author’s	personal	experience.	Names	were	changed.	
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had happened? The German friend had picked up the two women at the Belgium border 
by car, who had been working in Belgium as domestic workers without residence permits 
for several years, when they were stopped at a customs control near the border. Dressed 
up in traditional clothes for the Easter weekend, the Ecuadorians were asked for their pa-
pers and, being without a valid Schengen visa, they were arrested. To make things worse, 
they were detained for more than two months, so in addition to the changed itinerary 
and the extended length of the journey, they lost their jobs as they did not show up at 
work the next week. With North American passports or as members of a Japanese Bus 
Tour, they probably would have reached their destination without complications, but 
identified as irregular migrants by the border police, their touristic trip was harshly put 
to an end.
2. Ambiguous Mobilities
Migration and tourism correlate in an ambivalent manner.2 The introductory example 
describes only one particular manifestation in the varied relationship of these two repre-
sentations of human mobility. To name just a few further entanglements, tourist econo-
mies are highly dependent on seasonal migrant workers; touristic architecture, such as 
hotels or holiday camps, is used for refugee housing as well as for retirement migration; 
tourist boats and buses serve as transport for migrants; and long term travellers earn their 
travel funds by working during their journey.3 A last example proving perfectly how 
interwoven migration and tourism can be is the phenomenon of VFR-tourism – tourism 
related to the visiting of friends or relatives: Usually, the latter emigrate and settle some-
where before they are visited by friends and relatives who come as tourists. Sometimes 
this visit leads to emigration decisions as well.4
While scientific research most often focuses on either tourism or migration exclusively, 
some efforts have been made to put these two forms of mobility into relation.5 Yet at-
tempts of definition, trying to differentiate one subject from the other in respect to 
geographical, temporal or motive-related terms, usually fail due to arbitrary criteria of 
space or duration. To manage this problem Hall and Williams convincingly place differ-
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the result of a broad distribution of both phenomena frequently overlapping each other 
along the scale.6
Administration usually is not so keen on such ambiguities, however. From the per-
spective of states trying to regulate migration, a sharp differentiation is desirable. The 
problem of distinction is dissolved by visa issuance, simulating a clear-cut difference 
between migrants and tourists. In times of restrictive migration control they appear as 
two dichotomist representations of mobility – quite liberal for those travelling to spend 
money, much more restricted for those travelling to earn money.7 In case of doubt, the 
decision whether a person is seen as a migrant or as a tourist is made at the border con-
trol, resulting in the delivery or refusal of visa unless there are bilateral agreements on 
visa-free travel due to economic or political reasons in place.8 A migrant might receive 
(or be denied) a visa including work permissions, whereas a tourist’s visa is restricted to a 
temporary visit only. The decision is taken in view of the applicant’s financial resources, 
compelling return plans proven by tickets and secure occupation in the home country, 
and other criteria of both administrative and public ascription, what makes ‘a tourist’.
This article focuses on the representation of tourism in migration regimes. According 
to Jochen Oltmer, ‘migration regimes point to the broad interdependency of state and 
migration.’9 On the one hand, there are rules and institutional orders juridificated and 
enforced by the involved states. These rules are shaped by ideological and political prin-
ciples as well as by the economic situation which stimulates or moderates migratory 
movements. On the other hand, there is the agency of the migrants themselves, who 
participate in recruitment programs or change their employers violating their contract, 
cross borders with or without permission and take their own decisions far beyond what 
administrative and corporate officials have chosen for them. Both sides interact con-
stantly, one reacting to changes of the other.
Rules of entry determine the terms of cross-border mobility to a large extent. From the 
administration’s point of view, ‘migrant’ and ‘tourist’ are set as categories for visa or resi-
dence and work permits. However, from a migrant’s perspective, a tourist visa can enable 
him or her to gain access to the (grey) labour market or to live with family members even 
though these gates of migration are officially blocked. As a result, touristic motivations 
can be denied to ‘false tourists’ who are suspected of being irregular migrants by state of-
ficials – either because they come from countries with a high amount of labour surplus, 
6	 Ibid.
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or because they are seen as potential refugees.10 In fact, denouncing travellers to be ‘false 
tourists’ corresponds to similar discourses on the ‘real refugee’.11
The following sections will address the problem of ‘false tourists’ from a historical per-
spective on the Western European ‘guest worker’ regime of the sixties. I will argue that 
the boundary between migration and tourism, that theoretically seems so strict from the 
state’s perspective, has been actively blurred in times of economic upturn by the multi-
level state officials themselves. Taking examples from the French, Swiss, and German la-
bour recruitment, it will be shown how the alleged clear-cut distinction was undermined 
both by migrants and by state authorities. The latter adjusted the degree of control to 
economic and political cycles: More flexible in boom times to gain migrant labour for 
the prospering post-war economies bypassing their own official rules of recruitment, and 
scandalising the entry of migrant workers as tourists in times of stricter regulation. When 
free movement was not appreciated due to economic or political reasons, this behaviour 
of migrants was denounced as illegal and travellers from typical emigration countries 
were even refused the right to travel as tourists. This will be exemplified by analysing 
the correlation of migration and tourism in France, Switzerland, and Germany from 
the mid-fifties to the early seventies. This was the period of guest worker recruitment, a 
migration regime which first is worth a closer look.
3. Guest Worker Recruitment
During the era of economic growth from the fifties to the mid-seventies the demand for 
foreign labour in the industrial centres of Western Europe rose significantly. More than 
30 million male and female workers from Mediterranean countries came to the prosper-
ing industrial centres of Western Europe, especially to West Germany and France, but 
also to the Benelux countries and Switzerland.12 While most of them returned after some 
time or moved on to another country, some migrant workers settled and started families 
or had family members come from their home countries. Coinciding with massive post-
colonial migration movements, this resulted in the fact that, for the first time in modern 
history, immigration to Europe dominated emigration from Europe.
0	 The	last	aspect	is	true	for	both	immigration	and	emigration	control	as	the	historical	examples	from	communist	
states	as	the	German	Democratic	Republic	or	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	show.	Cf.	W.G.	Arlt,	Entwicklung	
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To control this influx and to prevent settlement, the Western European states tried to 
frame the recruitment of foreign workers through bilateral agreements. Some reach back 
to the interwar period, but the zenith of these networks of institutionalised temporary 
labour migration were the sixties.13 There are two understandings of what makes a guest 
worker system. In a stricter sense, it refers to the temporary recruitment of immigrant 
labour organised by the state and including contractually agreed rights and duties of 
all parties involved. This is also known as the ‘German guestworker model’14, which is 
sketched in section 6. In a wider understanding of the term, the aspects of organised 
recruitment and the legal guaranties to workers are neglected in favour of the core prin-
ciple of the guest worker system: rotation. Migrant workers were meant to come for a 
certain amount of time – usually one to three years – and then return, to be replaced 
by new migrant workers. This wider understanding not only allows us to look behind 
the curtain of the ideal guest worker recruitment as fixed in bilateral contracts, but also 
highlights a common pattern of labour migration in and to Europe in the ‘Golden Age’15 
including labour migration from (former) colonies.
No doubt, the national migration regimes of Western Europe fundamentally differed 
according to historical migration systems, national self-perceptions and respective im-
migration rules, but there are certain commonalities in policing immigration and the 
corresponding tendencies of settlement since the late sixties that point to an Europeani-
sation of migration policy in the early seventies.16 One is the state authorities’ deliber-
ate circumvention of their own immigration control rules.17 The scandalisation of this 
alternative path of immigration in times, when a stricter control was intended, is another 
scheme that can be found in all Western European states.18
4. France – regularisation as official recruitment policy
The blurring of legal labour immigration and entry as a tourist is best exemplified in the 
French case. The official recruitment procedure in France was slow and complicated. 
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monopoly on determining the employment of labour migrants.19 Employers had to ap-
ply for foreign workers, before a national administrative request was made by the ONI 
whether there were appropriate candidates already available in France. If this was not the 
case, or if the requested jobs were on a confidential list of shortage occupations, the ONI 
mandated its foreign agencies in Italy or Spain to look for promising candidates. The se-
lected workers were referred to their new employer – provided that the company assured 
minimal standards in working and housing conditions. In case that the initiative was 
taken by the labour migrant, he or she also had to apply for a work permit at the ONI by 
presenting a valid contract and passing a medical check-up. Again, the Department had 
to assess whether there was another applicant available in the national labour market. 
Migrants from the French overseas colonies were not affected by these procedures, as 
they enjoyed free movement inside the Union Française. Furthermore, up until Algerian 
independence in 1962, mobility between mainland France and Algeria was regarded as 
internal migration.20
The ‘third way’ of labour migration to France was to regularise immigration ex post by 
applying for a residence and work permit after immigration. What at first was thought 
only to be an exceptional way for potential migrants who did not need a visa or had a 
tourist visa to enter France, soon became the most important gate of entry to the French 
labour market. In the economic upturn of the mid-fifties at the latest, the ONI was far 
from meeting the employers’ need for labour, so the French Ministry of Labour decreed 
that the regularisation of migrant workers should be treated as equal to the recruitment 
via the ONI.21 In addition to the promotion of labour recruitment for economic reasons, 
the decree aimed to regulate the origin of migrant workers as well: People from the Euro-
pean Mediterranean countries should have at least the same chances to enter the French 
labour market as workers from the French colonies in Africa, who by then already made 
up a large share of the overall labour immigration. The result was a rise in the figure of 
regularised workers who entered the country as tourists or without a visa to more than 
80 per cent of the immigrant workforce in France by 1968.22 The ‘spontaneous’ entry as 
a tourist, search for employment and subsequent regularisation of residence and work 
had become the official way of French recruitment.
As in other Western European industrial countries, the recruitment of foreign labour 
during the fifties and sixties led to the unwanted settlement of ‘guest workers’, i.e. tem-
porary migrant workers that were presumed to return to their countries of origin settled 
and were joined by their families. In the face of the excessive rate of regularisation and 
huge problems with a still continuing high rate of irregular immigration, French officials 
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reignty of which control over entry to the national territory is an integral part. So by the 
end of the decade, the hitherto official way of regularising the entry of labour migrants as 
tourists was abandoned. Yet the ‘third way’ of regularisation continued to play a substan-
tial part of labour immigration due to a bundle of exceptions concerning both specified 
occupations and countries of origin.
As in the other reluctant European immigration countries, this policy change had a racist 
motivation: It was not the settlement of labour migrants as such that was to be prevented 
as indicated by the free movement of persons inside of the European Community (EC) 
that came into effect at the same time for citizens of EC member states.23 By contrast, 
the measure aimed particularly at migrants from the former francophone colonies in the 
Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.24 For political and economic reasons citizens from 
these countries enjoyed free entry to the French métropole as tourists even after decoloni-
sation while work permits officially had to be applied for. Against all official statements, 
the immigration of migrant workers as tourists remained a major gate of entry. Despite 
there still being considerable rotation within this group, the settlement of larger postco-
lonial communities led to a rise of social issues and racial tensions.25
The ‘faux touristes’ (false tourists), an expression which had appeared in the French im-
migration discourse by this time, symbolised both the unwanted immigration from the 
former African colonies and the loss of control over this migration movement. This 
led to the implementation of stricter border controls and stepwise tightening of entry 
regimes for postcolonial immigrants in the subsequent years. Otherwise, as the Head of 
the Department for Population and Migration of the French Ministry of Social Affairs 
predicted in 1973, the problem of the ‘faux touristes’ could not be solved and France 
would become ‘the demographic valve of the third world’.26 One year later, in July 1974, 
the French government decreed a complete immigration stop, even including family 
unification.
5. Switzerland – a fight against ‘pseudo tourism’, no matter the cost
Talking about ‘false tourists’ was common in Switzerland already in the mid-sixties. Due 
to the absence of war destruction in Switzerland, the Swiss economy had its first boom 
immediately after the end of the Second World War. As a small economy, recruitment of 
foreign labour was essential and Switzerland built on previous experiences from before 
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the control of settlement, while the recruitment itself was left to the labour market. The 
Law on Presence and Settlement of Aliens from 1931 claimed that the administration 
had to “consider the spiritual and economic interests as well as the degree of over-for-
eignisation (Überfremdung, M. B.) of the country”27, the latter being a constant factor in 
Swiss migration policy. Dating back to the beginning of the 20th century this phobia has 
dominated both public discourse and alien policy since the interwar period (and is still 
influential today).28 Already in the boom times of the sixties several referendums were 
announced in order to limit the number of aliens living in the Swiss Confederation. 
Since these could be repelled by governments’ promises to fight the Überfremdungsgefahr 
(“danger of ‘over-foreignisation’”) several times, the debate culminated in highly contro-
versial referendums in the seventies.29
The great majority of labour migration to Switzerland came from Italy. This was due to 
traditional migration paths and to the decision of the Swiss government to restrict the re-
cruitment of labour migrants from ‘More Distant Countries’ (Entferntere Länder), which 
contained almost all countries without a common border to Switzerland.30 An exception 
was made for Spanish migrants who had come clandestinely in larger numbers at the 
beginning of the sixties, resulting in a Swiss-Spanish recruitment agreement to control 
this irregular immigration. Further exceptions were made for special economic sectors 
with a high demand for labour, especially forestry, nursing, and tourism.
As a result, this approach did not completely restrict immigration from ‘More Distant 
Countries’, such as Yugoslavia, Turkey, or Greece, but pushed many migrants into il-
legality. To bypass the strict border regime, many of them tried to enter Switzerland as 
tourists in order to find employment.31 To avoid this clandestine immigration via ‘pseu-
dotourism’, the Swiss Government decreed in 1965 that employment of foreign workers 
was only possible if a residence permit had been granted before crossing the border.32 
Furthermore, the border police was instructed to reject persons who were suspected to be 
‘pseudo tourists’. Travellers who arrived at the Italian border station Chiasso without an 
official Swiss confirmation of a residence permit and who could not argue convincingly 
that they were ‘real tourists’ were forced to buy a return ticket and return to Milan with 
the next train.
Of course this procedure frequently affected ‘real’ tourists as well, but this risk was tak-
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– EFP) Guido Solari noted: “Unfortunately, it would be unavoidable ‘that here and 
there real tourists would be taken for pseudo-tourists and treated accordingly.’”33 Still, 
he admonished the border police to “control pseudo-tourism energetically”34 at the risk 
of eventual mistakes. Moreover, this also concerned tourists who travelled to Switzerland 
by transit only. As the Swiss administration feared that migrants who were rejected, for 
example, at the German border and who did not have enough money to return to their 
home countries, would stay in Switzerland, there were even refoulements of (especially 
Turkish) travellers at the southern Swiss border whose destination was Germany. In order 
to transit Switzerland, they had to prove their travel plans convincingly by valid tickets 
and sufficient money.
As we can see from the Swiss example, the practice of false tourism is not limited to 
migration regimes, where it is officially promoted, as in the French case. It can also be 
found in recruitment regimes that focus on the control of settlement, as shown in the 
Swiss example. But how about migration regimes of states that engage deeply in both the 
process of recruitment and settlement control?
6. Federal Republic of Germany – a model case with all options reserved
As mentioned above, the German recruitment system was internationally regarded as the 
model case of a guest worker system.35 Beginning in the mid-fifties, the West-German 
government made several bilateral recruitment agreements with sending states around 
the Mediterranean.36 What made the German practice a model case was the high degree 
and depth of organisation. Companies that wanted to employ foreigners had to make a 
request for them at the Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit). This German 
public institution had recruitment offices in the sending countries and participated in 
the selection of candidates.37 Successful applicants were offered a working contract and 
an accompanying residence permit usually valid for one year. The journey to the em-
ployer in Germany was organised and paid for and the employers had to offer housing 
opportunities. After the end of the agreed time, the migrant workers either could extend 
their work and residence permit if their working contract was renewed as well, or they 
had to leave the country.
In contrast to France, the German migration regime neither knew circular (post)colonial 
migration nor the official encouragement to irregular immigration and ex-post regula-
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labour recruitment. Next to the ‘first way’, the official recruitment through the foreign 
agencies of the Federal Labour Office, and the ‘second way’ with a work permitting visa, 
there was a ‘third way’ of labour immigration: Entry as a tourist, search for employment 
and subsequent regularisation of the residence with assistance by their employer.38 Al-
though the Principles of Alien’s Policy39 agreed by the Interior Ministers of the German 
Federal States in 1965 stated that foreigners abusing tourist visa for job search should 
be deported, the so-called ‘spontaneous’ labour immigration was a common practice.40 
It was fuelled by the desperate labour needs of the booming German economy and 
supported by local labour agencies that were more interested in helping the local in-
dustries than obeying the principles of domestic alien’s policy. Therefore the Federal 
Labour Agency advised employers and their future employees to use the ‘second way’ of 
recruitment for personal recruitment by name. This procedure was suitable in case that 
the prospective employee had come in contact to its potential employer during a visit as 
a ‘real tourist’.41 
This ambivalence of priorities could be found not only at the local level, but also inside 
the federal government as a proposition by the Ministry of Social Affairs illustrates: 
Confronted with the problem of how to prove whether a migrant worker had entered 
on a tourist visa with the intention of working in Germany before his or her journey 
(and hence having misused the visa) or afterwards, the administration officials suggested 
counting the time between entry and taking up his work. According to this logic, the 
abuse was proven if the migrant started his work immediately after coming to Germany. 
If he or she had waited some time before taking employment, it was assumed that the 
tourist had developed the ‘spontaneous’ wish to work in Germany.42 It is obvious that 
the government tried to keep all options to enable or restrict recruitment through unof-
ficial pathways.
With the rise of social problems due to a poor response to immigration tendencies in 
terms of public investment in infrastructure since the late sixties, the entry of labour 
migrants as tourists was scandalised in West Germany as well. Turks, who had a grow-
ing share among the ‘guest workers’ and were soon regarded in the public as well as in 
political and administrative discourse as more ‘foreign’ than their colleagues from other 
European countries, especially came into focus.43 For example, the Head of Alien’s Af-
fairs in the Hessian Ministry of Interior demanded to stop the issuance of tourist visa to 
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exist.44 The Federal Ministry of Interior disagreed and insisted that visiting Germany or 
relatives in Germany had to be possible for Turkish citizens as well.
Taking the international oil crisis as a suitable opportunity, the German government 
stopped the recruitment of migrant workers in late 1973. This restriction of legal en-
try led to a further rise of irregular labour migration on tourist visas and unauthorised 
immigration through overstaying the three-months time limit. Although through the 
seventies and eighties the German government restricted family-unifying migration and 
controls of local settlement, tourist visas continued to be a major gate of entry.
7. Conclusion
Governments are not monolithic actors. The preceding examples of migration policy 
have already pointed to differing interests of multilevel actors. Especially in regions with 
a strong touristic sector, the interest in unhindered entry of tourists may conflict with 
dominating claims to control immigration. As the basic logic of immigration stops is still 
in force today in European migration policy, the suspicion of travellers being clandestine 
immigrants continues to impede tourism from accordant countries: Getting a tourist 
visa for the Schengen Area can be hard for potential tourists from many third countries. 
The case of the two Latin-American tourists without valid visas presented in the prologue 
is just a particular example. But as long as visa regulations are determined by the interior 
ministries’ claim for migration control, it is this specific understanding of tourism that 
defines what entitles a traveller to receive a tourist visa: Social and economic status in 
combination with nationality seems to determine if he or she will return. 
Thus, the study of the European guest worker regimes of the sixties has shown that 
migration and tourism correlate in a highly flexible manner. The administrative distinc-
tion between migration and tourism depended on both local and national economic 
and political cycles: In times of economic boom, tourist visas were deployed as a gate of 
entry to circumvent the official procedures of recruitment that proved to be too slow and 
inefficient to meet the industrial labour needs. In the French case, the regularisation of 
irregular labour immigration even became the major – and officially promoted – gate of 
entry to the labour market. 
However, in times of claims for more control on migration, migrants entering the coun-
try as tourists were defined as ‘illegal’ and touristic motives of travellers from typical 
labour recruitment countries were generally questioned. This was clearly shown in the 
Swiss example. But even in Switzerland, where the administration was keener to fight 
‘pseudo-tourism’ than in France or Germany, clandestine immigration via the entry as 
tourists did frequently occur. Yet the criteria to distinguish ‘real tourists’ from clandes-
44	 Federal	Archives	Koblenz	B06	39994,	Protokoll	der	Besprechung	der	Ausländerreferenten	der	 Innenminister	
am	5./6.0.970.
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tine migrants were never just economic, but also met ethnic-cultural and, hence, racist 
ascriptions.
On the other hand, migrants made use the whole spectrum of opportunities to enter the 
destination country whatever the official recruitment scheme was. Especially in times 
when the official recruitment procedure took long, the so called ‘spontaneous’ and rather 
autonomous entry on a tourist visa was popular. But also after the sharp restrictions of 
the immigration and recruitment stops in the early 1970s (and beyond) the entry as a 
tourist continued to be a promising strategy for migration. For the sake of completeness 
one has to add that the case of truly spontaneous decision of tourists to take up a job 
opportunity and become a labour migrant existed as well, but this happened on a rather 
isolated basis.
As the study of the European guest worker regimes of the sixties has shown, the assumed 
administrative clear-cut distinction between migrants and tourists is even blurred by 
the administration itself in times when immigration is needed. So it is another evidence 
for the complex relationship between migration and tourism that spread over the con-
tinuum of mobility, dependent on time, space, motifs and context. 
